منابع مشابه
Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration
Over the past century, collaborative work has become increasingly common in academia [61]. In the sciences, it has continued to spread as a practice across disciplines and countries [50, 51]. In fact, in most scientific fields, the majority of published work is now co-authored [40]. The social sciences, likewise, have seen an increase in collaborative work, particularly in fields like economics...
متن کاملBargaining and Destructive Power
The theory of bargaining as formulated by Nash (1950, 1953) has developed along two routes. One is axiomatic (e.g., Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Roemer 1988). Here, the negotiation process underlying the bargaining is only implicit. The idea is to try to characterize the negotiated outcome (the solution) through a set of axioms without formally modeling the process. The advantages of ...
متن کاملNominal Bargaining Power, Selection Protocol and Discounting in Legislative Bargaining∗
The effects of changes in nominal bargaining power, the proposal selection rule and discounting in legislative bargaining outcomes are investigated. The comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model better organize behavior than does Gamsons Law (1961). However, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under Baron-Ferejohn as coalition partners refuse to take the...
متن کاملEndogenous bargaining power
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom based on individual rationality we ...
متن کاملBargaining and Bargaining Sets
We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that exactly implements the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism corresponds closely to the description of the bargaining set and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Journal o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Relations industrielles
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1703-8138,0034-379X
DOI: 10.7202/050264ar