Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1070.0275