Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Property Rights and Intra-Household Bargaining
This paper examines whether an individual-level transfer of property rights increases the individual’s bargaining power within the household. The question is analyzed in the context of a housing reform that occurred in China that gave existing tenants the opportunity to purchase the homes that they had been renting from their state employers. The rights to each housing unit were granted to a pa...
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We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state ve axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a sol...
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Over the past century, collaborative work has become increasingly common in academia [61]. In the sciences, it has continued to spread as a practice across disciplines and countries [50, 51]. In fact, in most scientific fields, the majority of published work is now co-authored [40]. The social sciences, likewise, have seen an increase in collaborative work, particularly in fields like economics...
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The theory of bargaining as formulated by Nash (1950, 1953) has developed along two routes. One is axiomatic (e.g., Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Roemer 1988). Here, the negotiation process underlying the bargaining is only implicit. The idea is to try to characterize the negotiated outcome (the solution) through a set of axioms without formally modeling the process. The advantages of ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.011