منابع مشابه
Bargaining over Public Goods
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic fou...
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We develop a bargaining model in which a legislature divides a budget among particularistic and collective goods. By incorporating both private and public goods in a unified model, we uncover nonmonotonic relationships between legislative preferences for collective spending and the amount of the budget actually allocated to collective goods. Put simply, policy proposers can exploit coalition pa...
متن کاملPork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework
We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some parti...
متن کاملPrivately Contributing to Public Goods over Time∗ - An Experimental Study -
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contributionand the be...
متن کاملPublic Goods
We require an economic system to cater to individual wants to the maximum possible extent expressed formally by means of an efficiency condition. Because the set of efficient outcomes is a function of individual preferences, a successful system must elicit information about those preferences. That desideratum, along with the fact that the information disclosed by an individual will be dictated ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01438.x