Bargaining over Entry with a Compulsory License Deadline: Price Spillovers and Surplus Expansion
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining over entry with a compulsory license deadline: price spillovers and surplus expansion∗
We analyze an alternating offer bargaining game between a developing country (South) and a multinational over entry to sell a patented product where the South can issue a compulsory license if an agreement is not reached by a deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features: (i) the surplus from entry prior to the deadline may be negative and (ii) Compulsor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150031