Bargaining Over a New Welfare State
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining over a New Welfare State A Model of the Regional Distribution of New Deal Funds
The goal of this paper is to develop an estimable model of President-Congress bargaining in the US, and to use this model to provide a better understanding of the objectives behind the New Deal. In the model, the distribution of federal funds across regions of the country is the outcome of a bargaining game in which the President acts as the agenda-setter and Congress bargains over the final sh...
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Recent research on household behavior suggests that, ceteris paribus, a woman’s "power" within a household influences consumption and time allocation choices. From an empirical point of view, a central stumbling block in this line of inquiry has been identification of sources of "power" that can plausibly be treated as exogenous. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC, was paid only to s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1677433