Bargaining in Stationary Networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining in Stationary Networks
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players that reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium agreement links converge as players be...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.5.2042