Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shap...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00493.x