Bankruptcy Priority for Bank Deposits: A Contract Theoretic Explanation

A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy

Priorities and Priority in Bankruptcy

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model as developed in Green and Lin [5] and Peck and Shell [7]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in recordkeeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. Fo...

Contract for the formation of a bank account in Iranian law and comparative

 Abstract: By creating a bank account agreement, an account is opened under the name of the applicant in the name of the bank. In accordance with the provisions of this agreement and the intention of the parties to the contract, the bank undertakes to accept all the funds the account holder or third parties intend to deposit into this account with the account holder, and, accordingly, the acco...

Bank Deposits and Relationship Lending∗

I study the role of deposit accounts in bank-firm lending relationships, using a dataset with detailed information about all Norwegian firms’ bank deposit and loan account balances. I show that firms are more likely to increase borrowing from a bank where they hold deposit accounts, and less likely to end the lending relationship. In regressions with both firm and bank fixed effects, I find tha...