منابع مشابه
Bank panics and scale economies ∗
A bank panic is an expectation-driven redemption event that results in a self-fulfilling prophecy of losses on demand deposits. From the standpoint of theory in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Green and Lin (2003), it is surprisingly diffi cult to generate bank panic equilibria if one allows for a plausible degree of contractual flexibility. A common assumption employed in the st...
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Bank privatization and tighter credit enforcement are believed indispensable to facilitate the Eastern European transition process. We analyze lending by value-maximizing banks, the only source of capital in the transition, faced by non-performing loans to the state-owned sector. We show that banks have a perverse incentive to fund former debtors, although less efficient and more risky, because...
متن کاملBank competition and enterprise restructuring in transition economies
We investigate how bank competition a ects the e ciency of credit allocation, using a model of spatial competition. Our analysis shows that bad loans are more likely the larger the number of banks competing for customers. We study further how many banks will be active if market entry is not regulated. Free entry can induce too much entry and thus too many bad loans compared to the social optimu...
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as well as two anonymous reviewers and senior editor Olav Sorenson. We also thank Sahangsoon Kim, Clare Lee, Michelle Ie, Daphne Teh, and Yuhanis Yusoff for research assistance and INSEAD for financial support. A Working Paper is the author's intellectual property. It is intended as a means to promote research to interested readers. Its content should not be copied or hosted on any server witho...
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In a general equilibrium model with risk neutral and risk averse agents, we show that if banks issue both demand deposits and equity, then free banking is run-proof and ecient. In particular, we obtain the ®rst best insurance solution if there is adequate risk neutral capital. If sucient risk neutral capital is unavailable, then a partial suspension of convertibility is optimal. In general, t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1015695