Bank discrimination in transition economies: ideology, information, or incentives?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Lending in Transition Economies
Bank privatization and tighter credit enforcement are believed indispensable to facilitate the Eastern European transition process. We analyze lending by value-maximizing banks, the only source of capital in the transition, faced by non-performing loans to the state-owned sector. We show that banks have a perverse incentive to fund former debtors, although less efficient and more risky, because...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Comparative Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0147-5967
DOI: 10.1016/s0147-5967(03)00080-5