Bank capital regulation, loan contracts, and corporate investment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure
Do credit market conditions affect corporate capital structures? In an attempt to answer this question, I study two natural experiments that affect corporate access to bank credit: the 1961 expansion of bank credit due to the emergence of the market for CDs, and the contraction associated with the 1966 credit crunch. I document several capital structure reactions to these changes in credit mark...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1062-9769
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2013.10.005