Balancing Accountability and Effectiveness: A Case for Moderated Parliamentarism

In this article, I bring two key issues in constitutional studies — institutional regime type and electoral system choice conversation with each other, examine their interaction through a normative framework concerning the role that constitutions ought to play shaping party systems. The main goal is offer theoretical defense (ceteris paribus) of moderated parliamentarism as superior its alternatives such presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, other forms parliamentarism. Moderated entails strong bicameral legislature which chambers are symmetric (i.e. they have equal legislative powers) incongruent likely different partisan compositions). It has centrist chamber whose function supply confidence government, diversified check government. opposition elected on majoritarian (such approval vote or ranked-choice/preferential system, but not first-past-the-post); fully independent checking appointing constituted proportional representation model (moderated by reasonably high threshold requirement for translating votes into seats). wholesale shorter terms. alone power appoint fire unified political executive headed prime minister. well executive; members longer staggered terms. Moderated combines benefits types systems way optimizes four principles relation parties: it protects purposive autonomy parties enables ability keep democratic costs low; serves optimality principle making more every salient voter will represent it, also distinguishes between governance (which dominate chamber) influence space chamber); aids party-state separation giving significant (and over-weighted) powers smaller chamber; promotes anti-faction distinguishing polarizing factions from those factional punishing latter lot less severely than former). The traditional debates presidentialism parliamentarism, endured long because brings something attractive table. Moderated seeks combine most elements checks balance continuous precarity anti-factionalism systems, pluralism Because these virtues tension, no can maximize them without incurring cost another. one optimize yet yield stable effective type.