Bail-inable securities and financial contracting: can contracts discipline bankers?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Risk Regulation
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1867-299X,2190-8249
DOI: 10.1017/err.2019.5