Backward Reasoning and Epistemic Actions in Discovering Processes of Strategic Games Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Reasoning in Games
Strategies are the basic objects of study in a game-theoretic model. The standard interpretation is that a strategy represents a player’s general plan of action. That is, a strategy for player i describes the action that player i will choose (allowing players to randomize their choices) whenever she is required to make a decision according to the rules of the game. Traditional game theory has f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2227-7390
DOI: 10.3390/math8060989