Axioms for defeat in democratic elections

نویسندگان

چکیده

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is weakening Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition Independence Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). call this Coherent IIA. prove that five plus IIA single out method determining defeats studied our recent work: Split Cycle. In particular, Cycle provides most resolute definition among any satisfying for defeat. addition, we analyze how escapes impossibility theorem and related results.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Politics

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1460-3667', '0951-6298']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043236