Avoiding Massive Automated Voting in Internet Polls
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Avoiding Massive Automated Voting in Internet Polls
Internet polls are becoming nowadays more and more important as they are being used on a large scale. Their security aspects are probably the most significant and hardest issue to be solved when we consider web surveys. In this paper we present an innovative solution which considerably increases the security of Internet polls and the reliability of their results by discriminating between human-...
متن کاملApproval Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls
Doodle is a simple and popular online system for scheduling events. It is an implementation of the approval voting mechanism, where candidates are the time slots and each responder approves a subset of the slots. We analyze all the Doodle polls created in the US from JulySeptember 2011 (over 340,000 polls), consisting of both hidden polls (where you cannot see other people’s votes) and open pol...
متن کاملInterPoll: Crowd-Sourced Internet Polls
Crowd-sourcing is increasingly being used to provide answers to online polls and surveys. However, existing systems, while taking care of the mechanics of attracting crowd workers, poll building, and payment, provide little to help the survey-maker or pollster in obtaining statistically significant results devoid of even the obvious selection biases. This paper proposes InterPoll, a platform fo...
متن کاملLightweight security for Internet polls
Is it possible to implement practical Internet Polls that fulfill even the weakest security requirements? The technology available today would lead to a negative answer, because of the following practical constraints: standard, unmodified browsers are used, it is not economically possible to distribute certificates or even just user names and passwords, users connect from different workstations...
متن کاملPolls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation
How do polls influence strategic voting under proportional representation? This paper derives a strategic calculus of voting for coalitions that generates testable predictions about the effects of polls on strategic voting in elections involving four or more parties. Incentives of leftist voters to vote for a centrist over a noncentrist party are shown to increase with the difference in expecte...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1571-0661
DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2007.12.024