Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract

Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity may arise when governance choices impact the equilibrium degree of coordination among agents. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort...

Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry

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Electronic Companion — “ Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions : Evidence from Automobile Product Development ”

Asymmetric Vertical Integration

We examine vertical backward integration in a reducedform model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force ...

Is Vertical Integration Anticompetitive?