Automated liquidity provision

Ineffi cient Liquidity Provision

We prove that in competitive market economies with no insurance for idiosyncratic risks, agents will always overinvest in illiquid long term assets and underinvest in short term liquid assets. We take as our setting the seminal model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who first posed the question in a tractable model. We reach such a simple conclusion under mild conditions because we stick to the ba...

Asymmetric Information and Liquidity Provision

The presence of information asymmetry increases the probability that a potential predator will provide liquidity rather than engaging in predatory trading during liquidation by a distressed trader. More information asymmetry is associated with lower expected losses from liquidation for the distressed trader in illiquid markets. There is a negative correlation between the degree of information a...

Liquidity provision and optimal bank regulation

We extend the set of regulatory instruments for banks’ liquidity provision by adding a policy instrument for controlling the fraction of perfectly-liquid accounts. We demonstrate how this instrument induces self-selection on behalf of depositors who are differentiated according to their probability of facing a liquidity shock. This selfselection leads to a market segmentation, which can break t...

Optimal Banking Regulation with Endogenous Liquidity Provision

In a money-search model where deposits are used as means-of-payments, banks have expertise to obtain higher returns from assets with a cost and an economy of scale but are subject to limited commitment and moral hazard. They can pledge a proportion of asset holdings to issue deposits. Optimal regulation trades off efficiency in assetmanagement and liquidity service banks provide. An optimal cha...

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Limit Order Markets