منابع مشابه
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In a recent meta-analysis, Johnson and Eagly (1989) questioned our conceptualization of and evidence for the effects of involvement on persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1986). In particular, they concluded that (a) what we had termed issue involvement represented two distinct types of involvement (outcomeversus value-relevant), (b) each type of involvement had unique effects on persuasion, an...
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Although the construct of mindfulness has seen diverging definitions in the field of psychology (Gethin, 2011), general themes among these definitions are relevant to attitudes and persuasion. One of these accounts of mindfulness, representing a more Western approach, is that provided by Langer (1989; Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000). In this account, mindfulness is seen as bringing one’s full resour...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.2.448