Australian perspective on engaging with South Korea in the Indo?Pacific

How do the US allies engage with other actors in US-led Indo-Pacific security order? This article examines this question case of Australia. We argue that regional strategic network is a key consideration for Australia to facilitate its interaction target country Indo-Pacific. analyzes Australia's approach toward South Korea as an example demonstrating significance shaping diplomacy. It does so by addressing following three questions. First, what vision Indo-Pacific? Second, how perceive Korea's role Third, find relevance interests? The elucidates view on place influences and consequently plays integral part order-building process. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“?????????????”????????????????????????????????????????????? ¿Cómo interactúan los aliados de EE. UU. con otros actores en el orden seguridad del Indo-Pacífico liderado por UU.? Este artículo examina esta cuestión caso Argumentamos que la red estratégica es una consideración clave para facilite su interacción un país objetivo Indo-Pacífico. analiza enfoque hacia Corea Sur como ejemplo demuestra importancia configuración diplomacia Lo hace abordando las siguientes tres preguntas. Primero, ¿cuál visión Indo-Pacífico? En segundo lugar, ¿cómo percibe papel Tercero, encuentra relevancia intereses Australia? El aclara opinión sobre lugar influye y, consecuencia, juega proceso construcción Estados Unidos. In realist international politics, power order based national capability greatly influence relations among countries. politics viewed through lens, hand, relationships between state exist web players, individual form intrinsically become central variables affect actors' relationships. network, authority hierarchy are created informal practices fundamentally relational phenomenon (MacDonald, 2018). Trilateralism, minilateralism, multilateralism—with or without United States participation—constitute compliments post-WWII Asia centered hub-and-spoke system, is, system bilateral alliances. intends minilateral multilateral structures allied countries Asia, ultimately cooperate one another greater networked architecture (Fontaine et al., 2017). Conceptually, perspective shows formation consequences line intention. During Obama's presidency, example, was practiced frequent complex joint military training exercises under policy rebalance Asia. Security enables players come together “plan together, train operate together” politically economically interconnected region share burden stability (Carter, 2016). Without formal structure Asia-Pacific region, NATO Europe, stable developed efficiently jointly respond uncertainty rapidly changing environment encompasses traditional nontraditional issues. reflected foreign policy. A strategically beneficial should encourage both patterns: first, mini- cooperation which invites partners carries out leading position group; second, participation States. active forms network. Frances Adamson (2018), Department Foreign Affairs Trade (DFAT) Secretary, pointed not great recognize strength partnerships. has been actively participating such Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Quad, AUKUS, where seeks tie (S. Kim, 2023). States-Australia-Japan Defense Ministers Meetings were held June October 2022 consolidate their alignment. Joint Vision Statement issued after meeting, collectively criticized Russia expressed concerns about disputes East China Seas Taiwan Strait. follow-up trilateral defense ministerial meeting reviewed progress agreed agendas discussed June. Repeated tripartite dialogs recent year imply solid growing coordination these current Asian order, characterized diversified threats rise China, alliance rooted era. delves into change from Australia, questioning engages order. paper focuses diplomatic actions. Both have treaty since 1950s hub-and-spokes region. However, unlike proactively endorsed strategy responded response States-led endeavor relatively cautious initially. sheds light networks explain gap two allies: it phenomenon, explores direction. explains status (Chung, 2023; Cooper, Yeo & Chung, Greater refers potential goal could strive reinforce reshape relations. argument upon observation pursuit originates evolving nature alliance-based systemic changes, China. engagement context expanding maintain compiles official publications Australian government, including white papers views scholars commentators disseminated academic research institutes think tanks, Lowy Institute, Policy Institute International Affairs, Perth USAsia Centre, University Western Defence Institute. ‘The “Asia-Pacific” commonly used geopolitical construct. […] term “Indo-Pacific” emerged more recently. captures spanning Indian Ocean western Pacific Ocean. emphasizes geographic corridor India terms can be define setting they useful frames interests' (Australian Government, 2013; p. 30). White Paper, published 2013, elaborates outlook focusing broadly defines “new arc,” construct,” “system” maritime Southeast at center connecting Oceans (Department Defence, 2013). reaction countries' strategies conceptual development within Therefore, inception concept motivated entirely external impact partnerships, though region-wide acceptance over years further boosted burgeoning version became inseparable primary strategy-making. 2017, transformed semi-strategy Quad Before had roots Japan, specifically, Shinzo Abe's (Abe, 2006; Ministry 2007). exchanges ideas countries, States-Japan Japan-India, Abe enunciated “Free Open Strategy” (FOIP strategy) his summit Narendra Modi, Prime Minister, 2016, followed India's adoption FOIP (Dreyer Teufel, 2021; Modi President Donald Trump 2017. officially adopted initiative 2017 speech Secretary State Rex Tillerson (Tillerson, As indicated chain adopting actors, expected see idiosyncratic interpretations actions related each dimensions mental maps, political/ideological drivers, visions (T. Wilkins 2022). her National University, stated “nation only 25 million people” facing challenging world, “chose identify being importance Australia” (Adamson, geostrategic focus critical component vision. Bill Paterson, former Ambassador North Korea, comments “if truly considered significant player Indo-Pacific,” important “undercutting perceptions retreat Anglosphere” particularly announcing AUKUS (B. 2021). Growing rising China's material normative domestic drivers building (Abbondanza, 2022; J. Kim Raswant, 2022a; Medcalf, 2014). Nevertheless, observed past few found create substance beyond political rhetoric even if tries allies, framework. While favor Free idea, much warier, most momentous Moon Morrison did lead binding publicly bigger picture (Hundt, 2018; Shoebridge, different seek play roles framework, Australia-Korea lagged behind aspects relationship (Channer, 2021b). Minilateral groupings architectures advances interests agenda “key tool policy” address “high priority strategic” issues compared organizations Trade, 2021, 2). aims forming chooses participate maximize Meanwhile, also holds meetings than States, Australia-Indonesia-Timor-Leste Australia-India-Indonesia meetings. These taking ministers' level senior officials' level. ASEAN-centered forums ASEAN Plus, Summit, Regional Forum. primarily driven requirements, reinforcing preparing combination tools cope occurring there no like Europe. requirements inseparable. An report Standing Committee 1997 provides narrative continue policy-making follows: “ANZUS mutually arrangements which, things, economic contribute maintenance broader growth security” (Joint Committee, 1997). Depending government elites, would given requirements; however, considerations shape practice maintaining If same priorities, able step up achieve qualitative development. discussion elaborates, tend priorities augmenting Moreover, Australians, close neighbor people-to-people dimension survey Australians' feelings towards asked sentiments Australians around world when hundred means very favorable feeling zero unfavorable (Kassam, 57 2020 increased 61 ranked middle 20 surveyed. 2021: (62), Japan (73), (62). Compared ally sentiment less every 2006 2021. Furthermore, give people impression “best friend” country. best friend 2014 gave fewest votes total six (China, Indonesia, India, Singapore, Korea) may thought limit because located geographically New Zealand Islands direct either US. developing deeper strengthened so-called “quasi allies” (Ishihara, 2016; Park, T. S. Wilkins, 2015). From viewpoint, yet fully capture attention business community emerging economies (Flake, 2020). Since “natural nodes” act hubs 2017); par powers (Springer, One developments Australia-Japan signing Reciprocal Access Agreement January facilitates establishes procedures while force visits conducted Seoul (SNU) Korean third top Sweden. contrast, 20th SNU least likable (Y. inclusion positive news Australia; result reiterates Koreans potentially so. bottom welcoming factor maintains ties Japan. understanding approaches statuses partially partnership Japan; issue comprehended instance, describes “Special Partner” alliances “major global forums.” Paper puts “Australia supports reforms (to Japanese policies) Japan's efforts improve capabilities' pp. 40–41). Paper's description ordinary statement friendly like-minded viewpoint policymakers citizens who public opinion, improving capabilities incur concerns. Because “security capabilities” indicates intention policies continued end Second World War, cause unnecessary misinterpretation citizens. group advocates quo post-war inclined indirectly support reform cooperating “any deterioration Japan-South likely unsettle security, notes any improvement necessarily seen light, turn environment. concludes occasionally tense actually stabilizing first appears and, paradoxically, unreasonable dynamic Northeast Asia” (Cosh, 2014, Cosh's analysis Korea-Japan balance power. His insight managing country—Korea problem cannot independently supporting Partnership shared long term. Charlie Lyons Jones warns ‘without reconciliation Tokyo, tempted imagine nonaligned Eurasian rimlands work historically revisionist Japan' (Jones Lyons, 2019). top-down short-term matters depending regimes elected Korea. For Yoon Suk-yeol administration, conservative May 2022, influenced heavily factor. demonstrates interest boosting US–Korea–Japan platforms, antisubmarine navy drills time 5 September (Shin, diminished early stage Yoon's possibility joining platforms increased. expansion Korea-Australia frameworks increasingly expected. regarding handle make use W. Robertson, problem, discourage ever-evolving Australia-South officials. biennial 2 + Ministers' Meeting continues establishment 2013. Australia-ROK Dialogue Canberra August 2022. delegates ministries “respective Indo-Pacific” expand “regional institutions” promote elevated 2021 leaders Comprehensive (CSP). CSP contains upgraded domains science technology, industries, materiel supply chains, vaccine development, hydrogen economy, resilience, space cooperation. complementary industry structures, lacks natural resources energy goals capable partner (Cameron, Rapid made Moon-Morrison Summit November provide promising trade delegation minister acquisition visited minister's visit apparently move enhanced partnership. despite overall relations, still primitive becoming react approach—which but circumspect allies? patron relationship, alignment augmented coercion conciliation. already cooperative Korea? point view, develops shares purpose rather unconnected dyad Building ongoing 1996 AUSMIN consultations declaration, “Sydney Statement”, identified vital existent strong links deemed value common specified decades allies. particular, progressed (Dean Elfving-Hwang, Lee, B. over-dependence vulnerability process pursuing diversifying partnership, gained institutions noticeable considering, Economic Cooperation (APEC) David Hundt Deakin “South Australia's” Administration Another initiatives Peace Initiative, 1.5-track dialogue established 2014. Major joined Minister Cabinet, Considering country's cooperation, unlikely reservations effectiveness small large-scale meaningful difference tended refrain small-scale brought (Wilkins Although diplomatically dominant motivation effort lies stand-alone footprints, identity strengthening node hub deepened Kingdom, France, (Park, why initially about, particularly, secur