Audit committees’ oversight role in developing countries: evidence from Jordan

Purpose This study aims to explore the opinions of audit committee (AC) members on extent which they fulfil oversight role vested in them by Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC). Design/methodology/approach uses semi-structured interviews with 18 AC members. Findings The findings suggest that although ACs largely meet JCGC’s recommendations, their substantive practice is limited. In particular, responses indicate suffer from a lack real power, especially concerning appointment (or removal) external auditors and evaluation internal control. Moreover, have no actual issues deemed important for financial reporting quality (e.g. reviewing management estimates evaluating chief officer (CFOs) executives). Originality/value provides rich insights into ACs’ processes setting outside Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model where knowledge scant function. Hence, injects literature new qualitative-based evidence peculiar civil law country. Also, Jordan has spent time energy trying strengthen practices boost investors’ confidence. However, interviewees’ still far what regulators anticipate. Therefore, offer useful feedback think more deeply about current regulations. this can be extended other developing countries similar institutional environments, Middle East North Africa.