منابع مشابه
Revenue Maximizing Auctions with Externalities and Signaling∗
This paper asks how to design a revenue maximizing auction in the presence of post-auction market competition and asymmetric information. In this situation bidders can signal their type through their bidding behavior, which influences the outcome of the post-auction market game. Thus a mechanism not only specifies who wins the good but also describes the amount of information that is revealed a...
متن کاملCollusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
The standard mechanism design approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed, disinterested third party who designs and implements the mechanism. However, in many environments, collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties. When this is the case, the standard approach may be inadequate; it neglects potential information leakages and minimizes f...
متن کاملBidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
This paper considers auctions in which bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. Examples include bidding for patented innovations that reduce production costs, takeover battles, and the auctioning of licenses to operate in new markets (e.g. the recent spectrum auctions). We show that when bidders have an incentive to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bi...
متن کاملRevenue Maximizing Auctions with Market Interaction and Signaling∗
This paper studies the effect of post-auction market interaction and asymmetric information on the design of a revenue maximizing mechanism. In this situation, bidders can have incentives to signal their types to influence the outcome of the postauction market game. Thus a revenue-maximizing mechanism not only specifies who wins the object but also describes the amount of information that is re...
متن کاملSignaling through Price and Quality to Consumers with Fairness Concerns
Consumers with inequity aversion experience some psychological disutility when buying products at unfair prices. Empirical evidence and behavioral research suggest that consumers may perceive a firm’s price as unfair when its profit margin is too high relative to consumers’ surplus. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the effects of the consumer’s inequity aversion on a firm’s pric...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1058-6407,1530-9134
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12406