Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
We study indirect mechanisms in a setting where both objects and privatelyinformed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem, and must elicit the private information of the dynamic population of buyers in order to achieve her desired outcome—either an efficient or a revenuemaximizing allocation. We propose a simple indirect mechan...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.006