منابع مشابه
Auctions with a profit sharing contract
We study the problem of selling a resource through an auction mechanism. The winning buyer in turn develops this resource to generate profit. Two forms of payment are considered: charging the winning buyer a one-time payment, or an initial payment plus a profit sharing contract (PSC). We consider a symmetric interdependent values model with risk averse or risk neutral buyers and a risk neutral ...
متن کاملProfit-Sharing as the Optimal Wage Contract
This paper analyses the optimal wage contract when firms face demand uncertainty and workers care about employment stability. Workers choose the firm that offers the highest utility taking into account the future lay-off probabilities; firms choose the wage contract that maximises the residual share of the gains from production. For risk-neutral workers this occurs with any efficient wage contr...
متن کاملStudying the impact of quantity discount contract and cost-sharing contract on a two-echelon green supply chain profit
The members of a chain always try to find new ways in order to raise their profit. Hence we intend to study two different scenarios in a single item two-echelon green supply chain including two manufacturers and one retailer to study the effects of two effective contracts on members’ profit. Two scenarios are discussed and in first one, first manufacturer proposes quantity discount contract to ...
متن کاملCoordination and profit sharing in a two-level supply chain under periodic review inventory policy with delay in payments contract
In this paper,a coordination model has been investigated for a two-level supply chain (SC) consisting of one retailer and one supplier under periodic review inventory system. The review period and the retailer’s safety factorare assumed to be decision variables. The retailer faces stochastic demand following a normal distribution with known mean and variance. Moreover, it is assumed that unmet ...
متن کاملTruthful Auctions with Optimal Profit
We study the design of truthful auction mechanisms for maximizing the seller’s profit. We focus on the case when the auction mechanism does not have any knowledge of bidders’ valuations, especially of their upper bound. For the Single-Item auction, we obtain an “asymptotically” optimal scheme: for any k ∈ Z and ǫ > 0, we give a randomized truthful auction that guarantees an expected profit of Ω...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.007