Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect∗
We study auctions with endogenous outside options determined through actions taken in the aftermarket. We show that endogenous outside options have important consequences for auction design. In contrast to the case of exogenous outside options, auctions with less information revelation may yield higher revenues. Opaque auctions decrease the information available to losing bidders, which leads t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1868255