Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Designing Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions for Risk Averse Agents: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Designing efficient bidding strategies for sequential auctions remains an important, open problem area in agent-mediated electronic markets. In existing literature, a variety of bidding strategies have been proposed and have been shown to perform with increasing degrees of efficiency. However, most of strategies proposed so far do not explicitly model bidders’ attitudes towards risk which, in m...

متن کامل

Bid Auctions : a Theoretical and an Experimental Study

Title of Document: OPEN BID AUCTIONS: A THEORETICAL AND AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY Dipan Ghosh, Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Directed By: Professor Peter Cramton, Department of Economics For centuries, auctions have been used as an efficient market mechanism for selling or procuring goods. Over time, auctions have evolved from its very basic price callout form to the much more sophisticated simultaneo...

متن کامل

Gasification of potato shoots: An experimental and theoretical investigation

A thermodynamic equilibrium model was developed to predict the gasification process in a bench-scale fluidized bed gasifier. Potato shoot (leaves and stems) was used as the feedstock of the gasifier. The experiments were done in five different gasification zone temperatures (650, 700, 750, 800 and 850°C), with a feeding rate of 0.166 kg/hour, and two equivalence ratios (ER: 0.2 and 0.25). T...

متن کامل

Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions — An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights¤

We present laboratory experiments of ...ve di¤erent multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned o¤ among two bidders with ‡at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed–bid uniform–price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory seale...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2017

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3040075