Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation
We study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a common-value object for the bidders and a bidder’s valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation and Large Auctions
We start with the simplest possible model. There are kn objects for sale and n potential buyers. The valuations vi are drawn independently from a common distribution F (vi) for all potential bidders. We assume that F has a continuous density function f . Suppose now that the objects are allocated according to the following rule: kn buyers with the highest bids receive the object and pay the pri...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation and Large Auctions
We start with the simplest possible model. There are kn objects for sale and n potential buyers. The valuations vi are drawn independently from a common distribution F (vi) for all potential bidders. We assume that F has a continuous density function f . Suppose now that the objects are allocated according to the following rule: kn buyers with the highest bids receive the object and pay the pri...
متن کاملThe Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k + 1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction. We then consider a sequence of auctions Ar with nr bidders and kr objects. We show that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.7.2014