AUCTIONEERS, FENCE-VIEWERS, POPES – AND JUDGES

Television and its Viewers

Job Market Paper Competing Auctioneers ∗

We study a model where multiple sellers with limited supply strategically choose both the price formation rule and the allocation rule. We show that inefficiency in this setting arises both because sellers withhold the good and because they sell to lower valuation buyers despite the presence of higher valuation buyers. This contrasts with the findings of the literatures on monopolistic and comp...

Secure and Private Auctions without Auctioneers

Security and privacy have become crucial factors in auction design. Various schemes to ensure the safe conduction of sealed-bid auctions have been proposed recently. We introduce a new standard of security for auctions (“full privacy”), that prevents extraction of bid information despite any collusion of participants. This requirement is stronger than other common assumptions that prohibit the ...

Visualizing Solutions with Viewers

Visualization can be a powerful aid for learning a programming language. It may be used to reinforce central language concepts. In the context of Prolog and CLP-languages, however, most approaches to visualization aim at procedural aspects. Instead of explaining what a relation describes, visualization is used to animate procedural machinery. In this paper we present approaches to visualizing a...

Judges, Expertise, and Analogy

Political scientists have shown that one can anticipate how a judge will decide a case more often than chance, or a reading of the facts, might allow by using various predictors such as party affiliation, gender, or the judge’s own decisions on earlier similar cases. The simplest explanation for such behavior is that judges first decide what they want the outcome of the case to be, then go back...