Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auction and also limit the set of bids that can be submitted during a particular round. Economic the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information Economics and Policy
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0167-6245
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.04.001