ATTACK AGAINST ANONYMITY USING CELL COUNTING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Novel Approach To Cell-Counting-Based Attack Against Tor
Different low-latency unidentified communication systems such as Tor and Anonymizer have been deliberate to make available anonymity service for users. In order to hide from view the communication of users, most of the secrecy systems pack the application data into equal-sized cells. Through extensive experiments on Tor, we originate that the size of IP packets in the Tor network can be very ac...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Communication Networks and Security
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2231-1882
DOI: 10.47893/ijcns.2013.1069