Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities

The utility of a match in two-sided matching market often depends on variety characteristics the two agents (e.g., buyer and seller) to be matched. In contrast literature, this may best modeled by general distribution. “Asymptotically Optimal Control Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities,” Blanchet, Reiman, Shah, Wein, Wu consider utilities context centralized dynamic market. To analyze difficult problem, they combine asymptotic techniques: extreme value theory (and regularly varying functions) fluid asymptotics queueing systems. A key trade-off problem is thickness: Do we myopically make that currently available, or do allow thicken hope making better future while avoiding agent abandonment? Their analysis derives quite explicit results for reveals how optimal amount thickness increases right tail distribution imbalance. use functions also allows them correlated buyers have positively given seller), which ubiquitous markets.