Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Studies

سال: 1999

ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X

DOI: 10.1111/1467-937x.00096