Asymmetrical fairness in trade preferences

نویسندگان

چکیده

Asymmetric capacities across nations are a persistent reality in the global economy, but little is known about how people respond to these disparities. We provide first experimental evidence on phenomenon of asymmetrical fairness trade preferences. find that opinion divides over relative economic capacity partner: Citizens treat smaller and less developed economies very differently trade, even when asymmetric treatment disadvantageous their own country. Across different tests national sample China, we strong effects statistically substantively significant. also show applies both positive (gains) negative (losses) domains. Thus, while International Relations scholarship often assumes self-centered actors seeking benefits for themselves or in-groups, our results prosocial considerations limited weak can influence preferences strong—a refines understanding international power asymmetry its consequences.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Research & Politics

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['2053-1680']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231188298