Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information

On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information

Under incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of a public good, we establish sufficient conditions under which, despite the incentive to free ride on future contributors, the expected total amount of voluntary contributions is higher when agents contribute sequentially (observing prior contributions) rather than simultaneously. We establish this in a conventional framework...

Oligopolistic Markets with Sequential Search and Asymmetric Information∗

A large variety of markets, such as retail markets for gasoline or mortgage markets, are characterized by firms offering a fairly homogenous good produced at virtually the same cost. The present paper provides a theoretical examination of this type of market by developing a sequential search model with incomplete information where consumers are uninformed about the underlying production cost. W...

Sequential Games with Incomplete Information

Consider the following strategy profile, in which 1 plays a, and 2 plays L. This is a Nash equilibrium. Because there are no subgames, this is also a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. But it is a silly equilibrium, because if 2 ever found herself in a situation where she has to move, she would want to play R no matter what her beliefs regarding where she is “inside” that information set. [There...

Sequential defaults and incomplete information

incomplete information. In this model, investors observe neither a firm’s value nor its default barrier. The model takes into account the short-term risk inherent in default events, the market-wide impact of defaults on security prices due to counterparty relations among firms, and the cyclical default dependence effects observed in credit markets. We explicitly calculate the pricing trend and ...

Bargaining under Incomplete Information