Asymmetric reduced form Auctions

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Asymmetric Reduced Form Auctions

This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.019 Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZO...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters

سال: 2011

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.019