Asymmetric price adjustments: A supply side approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric price adjustments: A supply side approach
Using a model of dynamic price competition, this paper provides an explanation from the supply side for the well-established observation that retail prices adjust faster when input costs rise than when they fall. The opportunity of profitable storing for the next period induces competitive firms to immediately increase their prices in anticipation of higher future input costs. This relaxes comp...
متن کاملAsymmetric Adjustments of Price and Output
Asymmetries in price adjustment can reconcile contrasts between rapid price movements in inflationary episodes, consistent with classical theories of flexible pricing, and sluggish price responses in contractions, consistent with Keynesian theories of sticky price adjustments. Nonparametric analysis of SIC two-digit industry data indicates that negative asymmetries are more pronounced for real ...
متن کاملSearch with learning: understanding asymmetric price adjustments
In many retail markets, prices rise faster than they fall. We develop a model of search with learning to explain this phenomenon of asymmetric price adjustments. By extending our static game analysis to the dynamic setting, we demonstrate that asymmetric price adjustments arise naturally. When a positive cost shock occurs, all the searchers immediately learn the true state; the search intensity...
متن کاملAsymmetric First-Price Auctions - A Perturbation Approach
We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller’s expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequen...
متن کاملLarge Asymmetric First-Price Auctions - A Boundary-Layer Approach
The inverse equilibrium bidding strategies {v i (b)} n i=1 in a first-price auction with n asymmetric bidders, where v i is the value of bidder i and b is the bid, are solutions of a system of n first-order ordinary differential equations, with 2n boundary conditions and a free boundary on the right. In this study we show that when the number of bidders is large (n 1), this problem has a bounda...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.003