Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations
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منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations
Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations Author(s): Daron Acemoglu Source: International Economic Review, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 1003-1024 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research -Osaka University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527270 Accessed: 11/...
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thank Björn Brügemann, Bob Hall, Giuseppe Moscarini, Rob Shimer, and the participants in seminars at Northwestern, Yale and Duke for useful comments. I also thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism. I am particularly grateful to Rob Shimer for pointing out a serious mistake in early versions of the paper. The National Science Foundation provided research supp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.2307/2527270