Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.11.019