Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Contests
We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focusing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria are unique. If marginal product is also bounded, limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the pri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032