Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction where participants have affiliated valuations and private budget constraints; that is, bidders have private multidimensional types. This article investigates the existence and nature of monotone equilibria in this setting. Hard budget constraints introduce two competing effects on bidding. The direct effect depresses bids as participants hit their spend...
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We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104975