Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas.
Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032