Assignment and Pricing of Shared Rides in Ride-Sourcing Using Combinatorial Double Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Transportation Network Companies employ dynamic pricing methods at periods of peak travel to incentivise driver participation and balance supply demand for rides. Surge multipliers are commonly used applied following estimates customer trip valuations. Combinatorial double auctions have been identified as a suitable alternative, they can achieve maximum social welfare in the allocation by relying on customers drivers stating their A shortcoming current models, however, is that fail account effects detours take place shared trips impact accuracy estimates. To resolve this, we formulate new shared-ride assignment algorithm using combinatorial auctions. We demonstrate this model reduced weighted independent set model, which known be APX-hard. fast local search heuristic also presented, capable producing results lie within 10% exact approach practical implementations. Our proposed could reliable mechanism ride-sharing requests vehicles during times.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1558-0016', '1524-9050']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.2988356