منابع مشابه
American Interests and IMF Lending
Does the United States shape the content of International Monetary Fund conditionality agreements? If so, in pursuit of what goals does the United States use its influence? We present evidence that American interests do shape the content of IMF conditionality agreements. We find that American policymakers use their influence in the IMF to pursue American financial and foreign policy objectives....
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This paper empirically investigates the economic and political factors that affect a country’s likelihood to sign an arrangement with the IMF and the determinants of the financial size of such a program. Arguably the world and the global financial architecture underwent structural changes after the ending of Cold War and so did the role of the IMF. Hence, we update and extend the work of Sturm ...
متن کاملRussia and the IMF: Pseudo Lending for Pseudo Reforms
This paper argues that the IMF financial and good technical assistance to Russia in the 1990s has been less than generous. Not only the size of the assistance might have not been adequate but also the timing and actual disbursements of these funds were in sharp discord with pledges. More importantly, the IMF made a number of serious policy mistakes in both design and the implementation of the r...
متن کاملSome Effects of IMF Lending Programs in the MENA Countries
The goal of this paper is to examine whether IMF lending programs in the MENA region lead international lenders to perceive lower lending risks and generate moral hazard as reflected in a shift in the maturity composition of international debt toward long-term debt flows. We find that IMF credit in general generated moral hazard in MENA after the IMF large-scale rescue package to Mexico. The go...
متن کاملA public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality ∗
The paper explains IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality stressing changes in relative bargaining power of different stakeholders over time. It applies public choice theory to explain the interests of the institutions’ member states, its borrowers and staffs as well as private actors attaching their money to the IFIs’ programs. Using panel data for 43 countries between 1987–99 it is sho...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IMF Working Papers
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1018-5941
DOI: 10.5089/9781498324618.001