Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Relativism, Assertion and Deflationary Truth∗
We provide a deflationarily acceptable account of assertion in truth-relativistic domains. First, we state what we take relativism and deflationism to be. Second, we clarify the problem of assertion in relativistic domains by singling out the features that make assertion within those domains problematic. Then, we tackle the problem directly by generalizing a standard deflationary account of the...
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Nor are meta-linguistic claims such as ‘the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher is true’, ‘what John asserted at 3 o’clock on January 15, 2002 is false’, and ‘Since John said that it’s raining on January 15, 2002, and Mary said that it’s not raining on January 15, 2002, John and Mary disagree about whether it is raining on January 15, 2002’. There are two reasons why such talk, in stand...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2330-4014
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0001.006