Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy
Engel (Grazer Philos Stud 77: 45–59, 2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in var...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5