Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism

Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy

Engel (Grazer Philos Stud 77: 45–59, 2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in var...

Combining sceptical epistemic reasoning with credulous practical reasoning

This paper proposes an argument-based semantics for combined epistemic and practical reasoning, taking seriously the idea that in certain contexts epistemic reasoning is sceptical while practical reasoning is credulous. The new semantics combines grounded and preferred semantics. A dialectical proof theory is defined which is sound and complete with respect to this semantics and which combines ...

Reasoning about GSTE Assertion Graphs

Combining sceptical epistemic reasoning with credulous practical reasoning ( corrected version ) 1

This paper proposes an argument-based semantics for combined epistemic and practical reasoning, taking seriously the idea that in certain contexts epistemic reasoning is sceptical while practical reasoning is credulous. The new semantics combines grounded and preferred semantics. A dialectical proof theory is defined which is sound and complete with respect to this semantics and which combines ...

Reasoning in Epistemic Contexts

“Epistemology is about to leave philosophy and join the sciences as other disciplines have done in the past. Briefly, work on the artificial intelligence problem (i.e. the problem of making machines, specifically electronic computers, behave intelligently) will require a theory of how knowledge can be obtained by a system in interaction with its environment, what knowlege is (i.e. its mathemati...