Arms Control and Strategic Arms Voting in the U.S. Senate
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation
A big power is facing a small power that may have developed weapons of mass destruction. The small power can create strategic ambiguity by refusing arms inspections. We study the impact of strategic ambiguity on arms proliferation and welfare. Strategic ambiguity is a substitute for actually acquiring weapons: ambiguity reduces the incentive for the small power to invest in weapons, which reduc...
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A number of commentators have argued that some time in the 21st century humanity will develop generally intelligent software programs at least as capable as skilled humans, whether designed ab initio or as emulations of human brains, and that such entities will launch an extremely rapid technological transformation as they design their own successors. The speed of such a “Singularity” or “intel...
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We study a strategic version of the multi-armed bandit problem, where each arm is an individual strategic agent and we, the principal, pull one arm each round. When pulled, the arm receives some private reward va and can choose an amount xa to pass on to the principal (keeping va−xa for itself). All non-pulled arms get reward 0. Each strategic arm tries to maximize its own utility over the cour...
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An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Conflict Resolution
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0022-0027,1552-8766
DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029002004