Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?

On the Assessment of Causal Explanations of Unique Events

Causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events

Philosophers have long argued that causality cannot be directly observed but requires a conscious inference (Hume, 1967). Albert Michotte however developed numerous visual phenomena in which people seemed to perceive causality akin to primary visual properties like colour or motion (Michotte, 1946). Michotte claimed that the perception of causality did not require a conscious, deliberate infere...

P30: Are There Anxious Genes?

Anxiety comprises many clinical descriptions and phenotypes. A genetic predisposition to anxiety is undoubted; however, the nature and extent of that contribution is still unclear. Extensive genetic studies of the serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, 5-HT) transporter (5-HTT) gene have revealed how variation in gene expression can be correlated with anxiety phenotypes. Complete genome-wide linkage s...

Causal and Functional Explanations

Functional explanation, for long the mainstay of psychology’s autonomy, has recently come under attack. It is sometimes argued that higher-level generalizations are causally impotent, and do not really explain anything. Presumably only the reduction of higher-level patterns to underlying causal physical properties, and the specifying of lower-level, local causal mechanisms, provides genuine exp...

Why are there so many explanations for primate brain evolution?

The question as to why primates have evolved unusually large brains has received much attention, with many alternative proposals all supported by evidence. We review the main hypotheses, the assumptions they make and the evidence for and against them. Taking as our starting point the fact that every hypothesis has sound empirical evidence to support it, we argue that the hypotheses are best int...