منابع مشابه
Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?
T heory suggests that Japanese politicians have weaker incentives than U.S. politicians to keep lower court judges independent. Accordingly, we hypothesize that Japanese lower court judges who defer on sensitive political questions will do better in their careers. To test this, we assemble several new data sets and measure the quality of the assignments received by about 400 judges after decidi...
متن کاملPolitically Correct Information Adoption
This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted information is biased towards “political corre...
متن کامل"Politically correct" research.
However, a weight-of-evidence approach can only work if there is fill disclosure of industrygenerated unpublished studies. In order to obtain scientific consensus on such matters, we propose that technical reviews of unpublished industry data be carried out by scientists and other technical experts working under the aegis of institutions such as the National Academy of Sciences, the Health Effe...
متن کاملPolitically sustainable social insurance
Private information underpins a basic social trade-off between incentives and inequality. Normative models of dynamic incentive provision explore the optimal evolution of this trade-off. Many prescribe relentlessly increasing levels of inequality. Indeed, under a variety of standard preference assumptions, an immiseration result obtains: a privileged measure zero set of agents obtain all resour...
متن کاملPolitically Credible Social Insurance
This paper considers political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one. JEL codes: C73, D72, D82...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Sociological Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0735-2751,1467-9558
DOI: 10.1177/07352751211016036